Chaquita Brands International Guilty Plea

CORPORATE TERROR FUNDING

CHAQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL

INVESTIGATION CONFIRMS THAT GUERRILLA’S DO EAT BANANAS!

What is protection Money? Is it paid to keep the calm; to keep business operations afloat or is it payoffs to organized criminal gangs to prevent interference, threats and protection of employees from harm or even death. This is the dilemma facing all multi-national corporations. How they individually deal with the problem determines their co-existence in countries that suffer internal chaos, internal civil unrest and even paramilitary interference to control the government and the corporation. For American based corporations, the threat level is greater than ever before.

It’s complicated by U.S. government political decisions, hatred of American people and business. Recognizing that American corporations are vulnerable to extortion and threats, they try to maintain peace to keep business operations productive and profitable. This is the dilemma facing corporate America.

This may clearly have been the case in the Chiquita Brands International Inc. indictment for payments totaling $1.7 million in protection money over six years to protect its profitable banana company by funding terrorists in Columbia, S.A.

In response to Chiquita Brands recent guilty plea in U. S. District Court, civil rights organization, like “EarthRights International”, have filed litigation against the corporation to seek unspecified monetary damages and class action status. This case has been transferred to Newark, New Jersey Federal District Court. The EarthRights group claims that “Chiquita involvement violates not only the Columbian laws but also U.S. and international laws prohibiting crimes against humanity, extrajudicial killing, torture, war crimes and other abuses.” This action comes four months after Chiquita pled guilty to the payments.

The company, one of the worlds leading produce, banana distributors awaits sentencing to one count of doing business with terrorists organizations. The settlement calls for the company to pay a fine of $25 million and does not identify senior executives who approved the illegal protection payments.

As the former Security Director for two major multi-national corporations, I understand the dilemma that corporations face. At both corporations’ incidents of extortion and threats from foreign operatives, whether identified as terrorists or anti-government social groups were not uncommon. American corporations are faced with this crisis, in that they conduct business in foreign countries, with different social norms. While it may not be acceptable to reach agreements with such identified groups, labor groups or socialist antagonists, the corporate production and operations must continue. It is a difficult decision that all corporations are faced with in foreign territory. The problem exists that if the corporation participates in payment to protect the business operations and its employees, they may be in violation of federal and international laws. If they don’t cooperate, they may be forced to shutdown operations in that particular region, thus having an impact on employees and the bottom line.

The U.S. State Department cannot intervene, nor can the U.S. Military. At one of the companies I represented, a terror group in Central America raided the business operations, killed two security guards and kidnapped an executive. The plan to deal with the problem was to negotiate with the kidnappers, and obtain the freedom of the Manager. Utilizing former government operatives, negotiations and local political input assisted in the release of the Manager. There was no U.S. Government agency which could assist. While they were notified, little assistance was received. U.S. governmental officials assisted in providing information about the group, intelligence and introduction to former governmental agents to handle the problem. There are private companies that make a tremendous living being the intermediary in such situations.

However, in the Chiquita matter, the “United Defense Forces of Columbia” (AUC) is a paramilitary anti-government army. They have been responsible for some of the worst massacres in Columbia’s civil conflict, as well as responsible for the sizeable protection of the country’s cocaine exports. In addition to AUC, it is alleged that Chiquita made payments to the “National Liberation Army” (ELN) and the leftist “Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia” (FARC) as the control of the company’s banana business shifted.

Chiquita maintains it made the payments to ensure the safety of its workers. Company spokesman Michael Mitchell explains that “these are payments that the company was forced to make to protect the lives and safety of our employees”.(AP Business Writer. Jeffrey Gold)

It was determined that the payments were made by Chiquita subsidiary “Banadex”, which was sold in 2004. A 2003 Organization of American States report indicates that in 2001 a ship that was owned by Banadex was to bring 3000 assault rifles and ammunition to the paramilitary who had bought the arms from an international arms dealer. At the time the paramilitaries were consolidating control of the URABA banana region through massacres and assassinations. Mitchell went on to explain that Banadex changed its policies after the shipment. He further states that Columbia and the OAS found no wrongdoing by Chiquita or any of its employees.

How do we protect American corporations in foreign lands? It is apparent that the corporation is on its own. Most multi-national corporations develop relationships with the political control of the country and have a local consultant on the payroll to deal with the ongoing business and social problems that face the corporation. Is this criminal? Is the corporation in violation of U.S. Federal or International laws? Incidents like the Chiquita file suggests that decisions of the corporation is a balance on a tightrope of business ethics to protect the business from disruption, extortion and even murder. The risk is great the business decision may well be criminal by American standards, while it may be an acceptable practice in the foreign land that the U.S. Corporation operates within. Our naivety in meeting the standards of U.S. codes operating within a foreign land may not be the right formula to work in a multi-national environment.

WHAT DO YOU THINK? LET US KNOW!!!

TERROR ALERT - GROCERY STORE SCAMS

TERROR WATCH

GROCERY OPERATIONS ACROSS AMERICA

BABY-FORMULA SCAM –
CONTINUING MIDDLE-EAST STOREOWNER FRAUD


In the Eastern District of New York, federal charges were unsealed against Ibriham Qunbar and Salah Nabban, owners of Palco Trading LLC of Brooklyn New York. The United States Attorney charged the individuals in a scheme to defraud the Internal Revenue Service, “to attempt to evade and defeat substantial income tax due and owing to the United States of America.” It’s alleged that they filed false and fraudulent income tax returns, filed for an S Corporation, defraud the United States for “impeding, impairing, obstructing and defeating the lawful functions of the Internal Revenue Service”.

These tax charges stem from a scheme by the two defendants in a scam involving stolen and expired baby formula. It’s alleged that Qunbar and Nabban through their company Palco Trading, LLC turned black-market infant formula into profits that they never reported to the IRS.

This scam has been an ongoing method of Middle Eastern Grocery Store Owners over the past 20 years. The sale of adulterated baby formula in the South West and the Mid-West was ongoing during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s by organized criminal Middle-Eastern enterprises affiliated with terror cell operations within the United States.

In this matter, Qunbar and Nabban owned a business that supplied grocery products by distribution to numerous grocery outlets. Palco Trading LLC is located at 791 Rogers Ave. Brooklyn, New York. This address has a history as being associated with Arab Mini-Marts during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s which was identified as “M & M Supermarket” then listed as affiliated and associated with Radwan Ayoub, the “Coupon King” of the 1980’s and 1990’s who helped finance the first bombing of the World Trade Center 1993, through more than $100 million dollars in coupon fraud in the New York Metropolitan area. It was Ayoub’s scheme that financed the World Trade center bombers, all whom have been convicted of the attack on the World Trade Center, and are serving more than 200 years in Federal Prison for their criminal attack.

Qunbar and Nabban are accused of buying baby formula for between $6000 and $16000 a batch, and then through Palco Trading distributed goods to grocery chains like Key Food and Associated Supermarkets. After securing the formula at under market prices, Qunbar and Nabban would contact the two manufacturers Ross and Mead Johnson a subsidiary of Bristol Meyers Squibb it’s alleged that they would seek refunds at full price.


At times they would buy stolen non-expired formula and sell it to groceries. It’s also alleged that at times they would create fake invoices to show that they purchased the formula at full-price from the corporations to receive the refunds, profits they never reported to the IRS.

It’s reported that they sold the store in 2003 for $1.6 million, two years before Qunbar was found guilty by jury trial for falsely reporting to federal officers at JFK Airport in New York City that he and his wife were bringing $12,000 in cash with them before a trip to Jordan. He actually had $22,687.

Is this an ongoing scheme by middle-eastern grocery store owners to defraud the manufacturers or is it a method of support of terror operations within the United States. Not to say the Qunbar or Nabban are affiliated with terror cell operations within the United States, it seems that the familiar behavior, the links to the storefront operations identified as a financial supporter of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and the use of Enfamil Baby Formula as a product to defraud the manufacturers and the IRS follows a pattern of years identified as affiliated with PLO operations, Hezbollah Terror financing, and Abu Nidal Terror operations in the Mid West.

Is this a coincidence or is it a method of business by middle–eastern businessmen to defraud, destabilize and impact American corporations.
E-MAIL US YOUR OPINION..

IOS / A QUESTION OF SLIGHT OF HAND / AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE COUPON FRAUD FROM THE FEDERAL POINT OF VIEW AND OURS

INTERNATIONAL OUTSOURCING SERVICES

A QUESTION OF SLIGHT-OF-HAND
Or
MISDIRECTION

AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE IOS FRAUD

On June 28, 2007 FBI Special Agent, Stephen P. Vitale presented an affidavit to the United States District Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin which details numerous issues relating to the IOS fraud and the actions of Bruce Furr, Lance Furr and Steven Furr. Special Agent Vitale is the lead case agent in the IOS matter, with assignment to investigate U.S. violations of mail and wire fraud.

His affidavit details the efforts of the law firm of Greenberg Traurig a defense on behalf of IOS and its principles that the business practice of “store tag defense”, is a business practice and method used by IOS and its predecessor corporation International Data Inc. They practiced “store tag” methods in accounting for coupon redemption for small independent owned grocery stores by submitting consumer coupons for redemption to International Data, (IOS) coupon redemption processing coupling them with large grocery chain coupon submissions.

The affidavit explains the practice that was submitted by the defense attorneys for Furr’s that “store tag defense” appeared to be nothing more than an accounting practice. In an explanation of the “store tag defense”, IOS would bundle the submitted coupons from small grocery stores with large submissions from such corporate clients as Pathmark, Winn Dixie etc. As the practice of coupling the submissions to manufacturers for payment under the mask of Pathmark (as an example) the submission may have been in the amount of $1 million dollars for payment to IOS by the manufacturers and its representatives. Research finds that the average monthly submission by Pathmark often does not exceed $400,000 of consumer coupons submissions. Pathmark was not involved; Winn-Dixie had no knowledge of these excessive submissions. Only IOS, Lance Furr and others within IOS not only knew but also participated.

The defense presented by Furr’s attorneys (remember IOS was released from criminal liability in a cooperation agreement), met with the U.S. attorney’s office in Milwaukee, asserting that “since IOS invoiced coupons a certain way, the company had in fact committed no fraud.” The defense strategy asserted that although coupons from small stores were sent along with coupons from larger stores on the same IOS invoice (listing only the larger stores) it was done only as a matter of convenience. The coupons were processed at the same location and efficiency and even saving toner was the logic. The defense poised that although the coupons were shipped together, no one could have been defrauded because each packet of coupons contained a “store tag” that accurately listed the store at which they purportedly had been redeemed.

S/A Vitale investigation into this defense lasted for several weeks. The government learned from a combination of multiple witnesses and physical evidence that this defense was FALSE. Indeed it was fabricated by IOS perhaps more than a year earlier with the intent that its attorneys pass the falsehood on to the government in a bid to prevent the government from going forward with its indictment for coupon fraudulent invoicing practices. The invoicing “example” also was revealed as a fraudulent document that had been prepared for members of the joint defense group during a plant tour in March 2006.

Between February and April 2007 in the context of litigation in the grand jury matter in Case No. 07-Misc-26, IOS lawyers from the Scott Hulse law firm, assisted by Greenberg Traurig, cited the “store-tag defense” as their key argument against application of the crime-fraud exception to certain subpoenaed documents. Counsel’s reliance on this defense was withdrawn after the United States presented IOS’s lawyers and the Court with evidence indicating that the defense was a sham.

S/A Vitale explained that in April 2007 during an interview with a Greenberg Trauig attorney, the attorney had concluded that the “store tag” defense likely rested on false factual information.

The investigation has revealed that each of the Furr defendants would have known that the “store tag” defense was false. Multiple witnesses have described the Furrs’ participation in the alleged diversion scheme. Lance Furr had admitted the diversion and the reasons for it to an IOS auditor. Exhibits A & B (encompassing Lance Furr’s description of IOS’s “deuce strategy” and further indicating that in 2000 alone, over $49,000,000 in small store coupons had been billed out under the name larger retailers such as Pathmark. Likewise in late 2005 Bruce Furr admitted that IOS had billed out small-store coupons as if they had been redeemed at large stores, claiming this had been a “bad business decision” but not illegal. Similarly, a cooperating defendant has reported that in early 2007, Steve Furr had a conversation with him specifically addressing the January 10, 2007 presentation of the false “store tag” defense to the government.

In June 2005, S/A Vitale reports that Pathmark, one of IOS’s largest clients, expressed concern that IOS may be using Pathmark’s name when billing out coupons purportedly redeemed at small stores. Steve Furr wrote Pathmark the (1) only Pathmark coupons are invoiced under Pathmark’s name, (2) all small store coupons were invoiced under specific well-recognized small store designation and (3) small store coupons were processed at a location 500 miles apart from where IOS processed coupons redeemed at large stores like Pathmark.

This is inconsistent with the “store-tag” defense presented in the claim that the coupons were processed in the same place and included on a single invoice to reduce costs.

S/A Vitale continues to describe IOS’s position and efforts to obstruct justice by intimidation of witnesses, employees and using financial threats and holding back payments to resigned employees as a method to have the employee agree to sign an agreement to remain silent to the FBI and then the money would be released. Agreements were drawn up by attorneys of Greenberg Trauig in these matters on behalf of IOS. (See affidavit for further details).

RAPID PAY PROGRAMS

International Data 12/31/00 Memo of “Rapid Pay Program”
“Rapid Pay” type programs are for Mom & Pop type grocery stores which need coupons processed. These are funded programs with average terms of 14 days from receipt of the coupons. There are three general types of programs”;



DEPOSITS

These programs usually require a deposit before payments are remitted to the retailers. The purpose of the deposits is to cover International Data (International Outsourcing Services) exposure on manufacturer chargeback’s generated from coupon shipments. Manufacturers payment denials often are the based on coupon expiration, foreign coupons (coupons sent to wrong manufacturer), not able to substantiate purchase volumes, not having the proper forms on file show that the customer even exists. The chance for fraudulent coupons in the small grocery stores is greatly higher than the large funded programs.

Normally deposits are not paid directly by the retailer, but rather most of the time deposits represent retailer payments for coupons received from the manufacturer that are held by the clearinghouse ( basically the first few coupon shipments are run through the system and payments to the retailer is withheld as a deposit until a deposit threshold is met. Once the initial deposit levels are reached and retailer payments start. The deposit levels continue to be monitored and compared against chargeback’s generated to cover clearinghouse exposure.

To mitigate the higher chargeback rates, International Outsourcing (ID) has invoiced RP coupons under other big funded programs that have lower chargeback rates. ID is a major player in the Rapid Pay type program. With the purchase of UCCH (Coupon Express) and NCRS programs, they have solidified their market share. Since these purchases, ID has kept the names in tact and has not advertised that they purchased these companies. Therefore, the smaller retailers don’t have a clue that all of the programs are the same company ID. This creates a problem for ID in that store owners jump from clearing house programs to other programs. ID has had trouble merging the information to transfer the data on chargeback’s from the stores to the new accounts within the ID operation. To do so, they transferred the information data gathering to their operating in El Paso to move the chargeback’s and deposits to the store with most current shipments. ID is still trying to complete the store merger program.

The purpose of Rapid Pay is to reduce the chargeback’s from the manufacturers and get a higher collection percentage from the manufacturer for the Rapid Pay customers. This reduces ID’s chargeback’s receivables.

One can question the issue of fraudulent submissions to the manufacturers by ID to increase levels of payment from the manufacturers and reduction of chargeback’s by coupling the Rapid Pay program with the larger more stable chain grocery stores.

NCRS – National
B&M
Rapid Pay includes Coupon Express, Priority and Rapid Pay.
(See Memo dated 12/31/00)

International Data memo dated 12/31/00
“Deuce Memo and Analysis”

The “Deuce” strategy – (a) all coupons are received through Rapid Pay – The retailers are paid through Rapid Pay for all coupons received.

“Some Rapid Pay coupons are still invoiced to the manufacturers through the Rapid Pay program.

Deuce coupons are invoiced to the manufacturers through the 5 programs mentioned using specific invoice ranges (8000-9000). The range is distinctive from the programs normal invoice range to make them easily identifiable.

The invoicing is loaded onto the A/R system in the respective program that it was invoiced under.

Manufacturers pay the program and the cash is applied on the A/R in each program that it was invoiced under.

The shortfall in the Rapid Pay program between total Rapid Pay audited receipts paid to the retailer compared to the amounts received from the manufacturer for Rapid Pay invoices shows up as a negative inventory gain.

The surplus in the other five programs between the audited receipts paid to the retailer compared to the regular program invoice and deuce program invoice manufacturer receipts shows as additional inventory gain for the programs.

The end result is a lower rate of deductions from the manufacturer since they do not see Rapid Pay as the invoicing entity.

It is understood that the large grocery chains, Pathmark, Winn-Dixie, and others similar to the large grocery chains have an approximate 14% coupon rejection rate from the manufacturers, while its known in the redemption business that the Mom-Pop grocery stores, small independent stores experiences nearly a 60% return rate.

This explains why IOS and other redemption centers concentrate on the larger legitimate grocery chains. Past experiences shows that coupon fraud by organized coupon redemption rings, terrorist groups and criminal enterprises submit bulk coupons to redemption houses which submit to the centralized clearing house like NCH- NuWorld who represents manufacturers redemption programs.

It is alleged that IOS and its predecessor International Data (ID) used a method of deception, fraud and intimidation to protect its interests. Where is Nu-World in its role between the manufacturers and the coupon redemption processing houses?

Where is Supervalu is the scheme of things? They are a 25% share holder in IOS; two Supervalu executives are on the Board of IOS. Supervalu owns NAFTA, while NAFTA has a business relationship, partial ownership of IOS.

Which Supervalu stores were submitting coupons to IOS? Were they in the Rapid Pay program or the Deuces program?

Where did the money from the difference in the submissions of “Mom/Pop” stores submitted under the banner of Pathmark find its resting home? Whose pockets were lined with the excess cash collected from the coupon submissions of the bulk co-mingled manufacturers payments?

We’ve seen over the past 20 years organized groups, some associated with international terrorism, others funding terror activities, and more directly a New York operation that helped finance the 1993 Bombing of the World Trade Center, killing six and injuring more than 1000, all using coupon redemption from listed Mom/Pop grocery stores.
Without the proper verification by such systems as “Rapid Pay” and the co-mingled submissions of coupons to manufacturers questions the intent of IOS and its former ID behavior as a means of greed, while inadvertently assisting the financing of terror operations within the United States.

Such programs fuel fraud, diversion and criminal behavior by individuals and corporations. In the IOS matter, the original offenders all Middle Eastern grocery store owners or registered coupon brokers obtained payment from IOS and transferred funds to Ramallah, Palestine. Where did this money go? Too whom? What for? We need answers!

Let us know what you think!!!
This is a look inside the IOS Fraud. While the company has been released from criminal liability, the principles of IOS, officers, specific employees and others are awaiting criminal prosecution, therefore they are innocent until found guilty. This report is an explanation of the details of a portion of the fraud presented to the United States Court in response to criminal proceedings.

SEE AFFIDAVIT

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